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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BART KOTTER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
ELIZABETH KOTTER, nka 
ELIZABETH VIENNA, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Court of Appeals No. 20070188 
Lower Court Civil No. 024100102 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPELLEE, Elizabeth Vienna, by and through counsel, hereby submit the following 
as her Brief pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of appeals pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 78-2a-3(h) of Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Petitioner/Appellant, Bart Kotter, (hereinafter "Petitioner") filed for divorce from 
Respondent/Appellee, Elizabeth Vienna, (hereinafter "Respondent") seeking custody of the 
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parties' two minor children on the 1st day of March 2002. Petitioner sought an award of the 
family business known as Team Builders International, Inc., and for division of the personal 
and real property equity in support of the minor children (R003,010). Respondent filed an 
Answer and Counter-Petition seeking custody of the children, award of the business known 
as Team Builders International, Inc., spousal support, and support for the minor children, as 
well as an equitable division of the personal property (R039). 
B. Course of Proceeding: 
A bifurcated Decree was signed and entered on December 20, 2002. An Order of 
Custody was signed and entered on March 2, 2004, awarding the Petitioner custody of the 
parties' minor children. The parties agreed to binding arbitration as to who was to be 
awarded to who was to be awarded the family business known as Team Builders, Inc. 
(R1808). 
Subsequently, the parties entered a binding arbitration with Judge Low concerning 
issues of the award of business, value of the business, and alimony. Judge Low issued a 
Memorandum Decision on August 18, 2004, awarding the business to Petitioner, subject to 
Respondent receiving one-half of the business value which Judge Low made findings on and 
that Petitioner would receive a "substantial alimony award." (See Addendum 6, 
Memorandum Decision of Brief of Appellant). 
On April 12, 2005, the Petitioner served Respondent Request for Admissions and 
Respondent failed to respond to said request and those admissions were deemed admitted on 
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May 27, 2005 (R2261). On May 4, 2006, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision 
in regard to Petitioner's Motion In Limine and partially granting summary judgment on some 
of the remaining issues (R3280). 
C. Disposition 
Trial was held on May 31, 2006. A Memorandum Decision was entered on July 27, 
2006 (R3659). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order was signed on January 
26,k 2007 (R3624, 3663). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case was filed on February 7, 2007. This case came on for trial on May 
21, 2006. The Petitioner/Appellant, Bart Kotter was present and represented by attorney, 
Greg Skabelund. The Respondent/Appellee, was present and represented herself, pro se. 
2. The Court only dealt with the remaining issues that had not previously been 
ruled upon. In this case, there was a ruling from Judge Low regarding custody and visitation 
on February 9, 2004; and then Judge Low issued a separate ruling concerning the business 
and related issues on August 18,2004, which established a framework of the law in this case. 
The Court is bound to work within this framework. The remaining issues at the time of trial 
were simply the division and value of personal property; value of real property; the value of 
the business; the incomes of the parties; alimony; payments of debts and obligations; and the 
outstanding issue of attorney's fees. (See Memorandum Decision of Thomas L. Wilmore, 
District Court Judge, dated July 27, 2006, Addendum 9 of Appellant's Brief). 
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3. At trial, the Appellant entered Exhibit 3, which set forth an inventory of 
personal property and their value, for his and Appellee's personal property. Appellant 
presented testimony that the Appellee entered his residence in May of 2002 and removed 
property valued at approximately $40,000.00. Appellee did not dispute this allegation. 
4. As to the values of the property, Appellant testified he had auctioneers appraise 
the property. The method that he used was to take the replacement value and reduce it by 
60%. The Court found this method to be reasonable, and it was uniformly applied to the 
personal property of both parties. The division and valuation of the personal property was 
not disputed by Appellee. Appellee did not provide any opposing lists for valuation. 
5. Based upon that evidence, the Court found the value of personal property in 
Appellee's possession to be $110,072.00, and that in Appellant's possession to be 
$46,120.00. 
6. In regards to real property, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision on May 
4, 2006, which dealt with the real property of the parties. The Hailey, Idaho house was 
awarded to the Appellee, and valued that house at approximately $175,000.00, pursuant to 
an undisputed appraisal. At trial, the only evidence provided of the mortgage balance was 
$532,839.14, which amount was provided by the Appellant. Based upon these numbers, the 
Court found there was equity in the Idaho home of approximately $342,160.86, which was 
to be attributed to the Appellee. 
7. Subsequent to the Memorandum Decision of May 4, 2006, the Appellant sold 
-4-
two pieces of property owned in North Logan, with net equity derived from the proceeds of 
said sale of $40,130.00. By agreement of the parties, this amount was to be split equally. 
The Court at trial ordered that said net equity would be divided equally one-half to each. The 
Appellee's portion of this equity was subject to an attorney's lien filed by Attorney, Jim 
Jenkins. 
8. The parties acquired a home located in North Logan, Utah. The appraisal 
values on the home, which were uncontested, were $650,000.00. The Washington Mutual 
payoff mortgage amount at the time of trial was $856,078.79. According to the Appellant, 
this would leave negative equity of $206,000.00. The Court additionally heard testimony 
from Candace Peterson, who is a qualified Realtor, regarding the value of the property. Ms. 
Peterson's testimony was in line with that of the Drexler appraisal of $650,000.00. 
9. However, testimony was raised by the Appellant concerning the value of the 
North Logan home, and the Court received from Appellee, with no objection from the 
Appellant, Defendant's exhibits 1 and 2. Exhibit 2 is an appraisal of the home as of 
November 2, 2001, which valued the home at $1,755,000.00. Exhibit 1 is an appraisal as of 
March 4, 2002, valuing the home at $1,850,000.00. The Court commented there was 
substantial conflicting reliable evidence concerning the value of this home. The Court found 
that it did not make any sense that Washington Mutual would lend more money on the home 
than the value of the home itself. However, the Court found that he house had been on the 
market for many years and the parties had not been able to sell it. Furthermore, the Court 
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found that the testimony of Candace Peterson supported the fact that larger, more expensive 
homes are difficult to sell. Based upon this testimony, and Exhibits 1 and 2 of the Appellee, 
the Court rejected Appellant's evidence that there was negative equity in the amount of 
$206,000.00. However, the Court did not find that equity value could be established from 
the 2001 and 2002 appraisals. The Court found that the most reliable evidence was the loan 
amount from Washington Mutual. Therefore, the Court set the value of the North Logan 
home at $850,000.00, and found there was no equity in that home. (See Memorandum 
Decision of July 27, 2006, page 3-4, Addendum 9 of Appellant's Brief). 
10. Regarding the value of the business and payment to the Respondent5 s share of 
that business, the court found that uncontrovertable evidence regarding the value of the 
business was presented to Judge Low via an expert provided by the Petitioner named, Keith 
Christensen, of King and Associates. That value was set at $1,629,100.00. Given that Judge 
Low had awarded the business to Petitioner in the August 18, 2004 ruling, the trial court at 
the time of trial saw fit to use that number as the actual value of the business, rather than 
depreciating that business by any amount, subject to the time that the Petitioner took 
possession of it. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 51, included as Addendum 
10 in Appellant's Brief). 
11. In regards to substantial testimony via Petitioner at the time of trial that the 
business ability to produce income had declined steadily subsequent to him being awarded 
the business on August 18, 2004, the court again factored in this not until awarding him the 
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value of the business, but when it made the termination of his ability to pay alimony. Gary 
Jones testified that he was a certified public accountant, and that for approximately February 
2004 and for the following 2 lA years, to 2006, average intake of money from the business 
Team Builders, Inc., had been between $5,000.00 to $10,000.00 per month (R737C at 79 -
80 and R737C at 80-85). 
12. Testimony was heavily considered by the court in regards to the income 
production capability of Team Builders, Inc., the fact that over $600,000.00 had been 
expended on attorneys fees and over $100,000.00 on expert fees directly associated within 
and in connection with this divorce action. The court placed great weight on the fact that the 
attorneys fees and expenses shouldn't continue which would result in substantially more 
income than Mr. Kotter through his business. (See July 27, 2006 Memorandum Decision, 
page 10, P ) . 
13. Request for Admissions were promulgated upon the Respondent which she 
failed to timely respond to and as such, were deemed admitted (R2249-2265). Petitioner's 
request for admissions included the following: 
"Admission 3: Admit the value of the North Logan, Utah home 
located at 2006 East 2750 North, North Logan, Utah, with 5 Vi 
additional acres valued at $600,000.00. 
Admission 4: Admit there is a negative equity positioned of 
$300,000.00 in the North Logan Home, located at 2006 East 
2750 North, North Logan, Utah. 
Admission 23: Admit the value of the business, Team Builders, 
Inc., as $800,000.00. 
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Admission 25: Admit you are not entitled to alimony." 
14. Those admissions having been deemed admitted have a legal effect of merely 
putting into evidence that testimony as if the Petitioner stated as on the record under oath. 
Because of the admissions and because of the Respondent's inability to fully provide and 
respond to the court's request for financial information, the court severely limited the 
Respondent's ability to testify and discuss the issues related to alimony. 
15. Nevertheless, the court found the law of the case was binding and that the 
Memorandum Decision of Judge Low made the award of the business to the Petitioner 
contingent upon the Respondent receiving one-half of the value of that business and 
receiving a substantial alimony award. (See Memorandum Decision of July27, 2006, page 
7-8, Addendum 9 of Appellant's Brief). 
16. Further, because the Petitioner allowed and did not object to and didn't raise 
the issue of the value of the North Logan home, and the Respondent was allowed to 
introduce without objection two exhibits regarding differing appraisal values on that home, 
the court considered the value of the home to be approximately $875,000.00. Furthermore, 
the court, in a rather exhaustive consideration of the Jones v. Jones, as well as the other 
relevant factors in U.C.A. §30-3-5 making alimony awards and combined with the evidence 
that it had presented before it ordered that the Petitioner pay Respondent $3,000.00 per 
month in alimony for a period of time equal to the length of the marriage. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly interpreted the Memorandum Decision of Judge Low from 
August 18, 2004 to mean that the Petitioner's award of the family business was contingent 
upon Respondent receiving one-half of the value of the business, which at the time when the 
evidence was present as the date that he was actually awarded the business was the testimony 
from Keith Christensen that the business was worth approximately $ 1,600,000.00. Further, 
the court correctly interpreted the law of the case was such that this award of th business to 
the Petitioner is contingent upon a "substantial alimony award" being given to Respondent. 
The trial court made more than adequate findings capable of supporting the 
Respondent's award of alimony. The court had ample evidence from Gary Jones, regarding 
the financial conditions of the Petitioner and Respondent, and a very clear financial picture 
of what income Team Builders, Inc. had been producing, which was the income the 
Respondent had been living off of at the time of trial, in order to calculate the Respondent's 
monthly needs. Further, testimony in regards to imputed income of $40,000.00 per year to 
Respondent was given by Denise Iverson, from the Department of Workforce Services and 
appropriately imputed to Respondent for alimony purposes. (See Memorandum Decision, 
Pages 10-11, Addendum 9 of Appellant's Brief). 
The evidence of the value of Team Builders, Inc., at the time the Petitioner was 
awarded the business was that it was worth $1,629,100.00. This was the value at the time 
the Petitioner was awarded the business and the court was well within its discretion in 
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assigning that value to the Petitioner for the business, given that he was given total control 
of the business at that point in time. 
The trial court's lack of comment on the practical effect of the admissions is 
immaterial as it goes towards nothing more than evidentiary weight of testimony relative to 
other testimony. It is notable that the Respondent's testimony has been severely limited in 
this matter and that much of the information that the court has gone and thought to make his 
ruling came from sources other than the Respondent's own testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION AND 
DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, OR COMMITTED HARMLESS 
ERROR, IN FINDING THAT JUDGE LOW HAD 
PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT ELIZABETH VIENNA 
WOULD LIKELY BE AWARDED ALIMONY AND VALUING 
THE BUSINESS AT $1,600,000,00 IN THE AUGUST 18, 2004 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
Petitioner relies on the absolute interpretation of the trial court's comments about 
Judge Low's Memorandum Decision dated August 18, 2004. Paragraph 40 of the court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law states: 
The court must determine alimony based upon the law of the 
case and the current financial circumstances of the parties. 
The law of the case was established by Judge Low in his 
August 18, 2004 Memorandum Decision. In the 
Memorandum Decision, Judge Low indicated that the 
Respondent was to receive a substantial alimony award 
according to needs and ability as may be found. 
(Emphasis added). 
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The trial court was merely noting that Judge Low anticipated some award of 
alimony and in fact, made the award of the business to Petitioner contingent on a 
substantial alimony award to Respondent (See Memorandum Decision, page 5, 
Addendum 6 of Appellant's Brief). Further, the trial court still accurately pointed out that 
any award would be based on the needs and ability to meet needs, as may be found. This 
statement shows that the court was not abdicating its responsibility to analyze 
Respondent's request for alimony based upon the traditional factors as found in Utah 
Code Annotated §30-3-5, but that the court merely noted that Judge Low had previously 
commented that substantial alimony award was imminent. The trial court still made an 
award based upon the evidence presented to it, the length of the marriage, the needs of the 
Respondent, her ability to meet those needs, and the Petitioner's ability to pay. In fact, 
nearly 7 of the 13 pages of the Memorandum Decision of Judge Willmore are devoted to 
just the issue of alimony, the statutory factors, and how the court arrived at it's award. 
The Petitioner has failed to show that any prejudice exists related to the trial 
court's reference to the Memorandum Decision of Judge Low on August 18, 2004. The 
trial court correctly states that Judge Low did in fact anticipate a substantial alimony 
award as was stated clearly in that same Decision. Nevertheless, the Petitioner was not 
prejudiced by that ruling as the court still had to base such an award on the traditional 
alimony factors, as cited to supra. Judge Low stated in the August 18, 2004 
Memorandum Decision "The Court finds that the award of the business would be more 
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appropriate to the Petitioner and is willing to award the business to the Petitioner should 
he 1) pay the Respondent one half of the value of the same and 2) provide her with a 
substantial alimony award." (See Addendum 6, Memorandum Decision attached to the 
Brief of Appellant at page 5). Thus the court practically made the Petitioner's award of 
the business contingent upon a substantial alimony award being granted to the 
Respondent. The Petitioner did not seek to appeal this decision, nor to clarify or augment 
the decision of Judge Low, and yet now complains that the trial court erred in following 
the clear directives of judge Low which is clearly the law of the case in this matter. 
Furthermore, no prejudice exists to the Petitioner by the court finding that Judge 
Low had established the value of the business at $1,600,000.00, as the court still was 
within its discretion in finding the same value at the time of trial. Trial courts are granted 
broad discretion in determining values of property, and those findings will not be 
disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 
304, at 305-306 (Utah 1988) states "there is no fixed rule or formula for the division of 
property, the trial court has wide discretion in property division, and its judgment will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be demonstrated." 
The Petitioners' accountant, Keith Christiansen of King & Associates, presented a 
valuation as of the date of divorce to the effect that the business was worth $1,629,100.00 
(see paragraph 51, Findings of Fact, included as addendum 10, brief of Petitioner). This 
valuation was not objected to by the Petitioner. Furthermore, the Court specifically 
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categorized the payments of $5,000.00 per month to the Respondent by the business as 
property settlement for her remaining interest (after several offsets were credited to the 
Petitioner) in the marital business of $452,788.26. This was according to the court's 
memorandum decision of November 7, 2006, and which was never appealed or objected 
to by the Petitioner. (See paragraph 66, Findings of Fact, included as Addendum 10, brief 
of Petitioner). 
Thus, the trial court was well within its discretion in using this number of 
$1,600,000.00 to value the business. Judge Low had referenced it, the Petitioner's own 
expert used it, and the date of Divorce is a date well within the discretion of the Court in 
valuing the business. (See generally Rapplyeye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, (Utah App. 
1993); Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1993). It is more than appropriate to 
value the business at the date the Petitioner was awarded and controlled the business, as 
the asset was truly his at that moment. Petitioner could have sold the business at that 
point, and if he received $1,600,000.00 for the business, no doubt the Petitioner would 
not be complaining about the value now. Just because the market and or business 
changed in a negative manner subsequent to the Petitioner being awarded the business 
does not mean that it was inappropriate for the court to value it as of the date petitioner 
was awarded the business. Had Respondent been awarded her share of the business on 
the same date as the Petitioner, she could have sold it and perhaps yielded the entire 
$800,000.00 value for her share. However, Respondent was not allowed the chance to 
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get that value out of the business because Petitioner had control over it and did not sell 
the business. Had the business increased in value after Petitioner was awarded it, I doubt 
we would hear him complain so loudly when asked to pay his share to Respondent. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT MADE ADEQUATE FINDINGS TO 
SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY GIVEN THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO IT. 
As stated in Utah Code Ann., §30-3-4. l(7)(a), the court shall consider at least the 
following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
See also, Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985); and Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). The Petitioner 
goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the trial court made inadequate findings about 
the aforementioned factors in regards to the Respondent. However, what Petitioner fails 
to clearly articulate is that the trial court is not required to supply factual findings, but 
merely to make the best decision from the evidence adduced at trial. The trial court need 
not only look at the evidence presented by the Respondent, but at all evidence available in 
making its decision. The court looked at the following evidence in making its award of 
alimony: 
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a) The length of the marriage. (Finding of Fact Paragraph 39); 
b) The educational background of the Respondent and Petitioner. (Finding of 
Fact Paragraph 39); 
c) The temporary alimony award made through use of the business income 
pursuant to a Memorandum Decision from Judge Low dated August 18, 
2004. (Finding of Fact paragraph 40); 
d) The factors as outlined in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), 
which were "[cjarefully considered by the court and are fully set forth in the 
court's July 27, 2006 Memorandum Decision. The findings on these factors 
have not been fully stated in [the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
prepared by Petitioner]." (Findings of Fact paragraph 42); 
e) The relative fault of the parties. (Findings of Fact paragraph 41); 
f) Whether or not this marriage was a long-term marriage, which is proper 
considering that an alimony award should, after a marriage of long duration, 
equalize the parties1 respective standards of living and maintain them at a 
level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); 
g) The income of the Petitioner's spouse of $2,000.00 per month, which is 
drawn directly from the business itself and may be considered by the court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(g)(iii)(A), which states that a court 
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may consider "[t]he subsequent spouses ability to share living expenses;" 
and 
h) Whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned by the payor 
spouse, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(a)(vi). 
Clearly the trial court went to great lengths to address as many of the factors 
needed as possible given the evidence before it. While the Respondent may not have 
provided all of the needed information to support her claim for alimony, it is clear that the 
trial court found enough evidence from the total evidence presented to make an 
appropriate award of alimony and to equalize the parties respective incomes. The 
unchallenged finding of the court as stated in paragraph 42 under "Jones Factors" in 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Petitioner states in regards to 
the Jones factors as follows: "These [Jones factors] were carefully considered by the court 
and are fully set forth in the court's July 27, 2006 Memorandum Decision. The findings 
on these factors have not been fully stated in this document by Petitioner." Nothing in 
this finding has been challenged by the Petitioner on appeal. The July 27, 2006 
Memorandum Decision has never been challenged by the Petitioner. It is, for all intents 
and purposes, the law of the case. 
Utah's case law is clear that a long term marriage should be treated differently 
from a short term marriage. It is unquestioned that this a long term marriage and that this 
is a circumstance in which it is appropriate to try to equalize the parties' respective 
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standards of living. See, Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P2d. 428, (Utah App. 1991); 
Gardener v. Gardener, 748 P2d. 1076, 1081 (Utah 1998); Olsen v. Olsen. 704 P2d. 564, 
566 (Utah 1985); Higlev v. Higlev, 676, P2d. 379, 381 (Utah 1983). 
Our Utah Court of Appeals has reversed trial court awards as inadequate in long 
term marriages and directed courts to enter an order of alimony necessary to "equalize the 
parties' abilities to go forward with their respective lives." Howell v. Howell 806 P2d. 
1209,1213 (Utah App. 1991). 
The court did consider what information it had in regards to the financial 
conditions of the Respondent. The court clearly had some information about the 
Respondent's difficult living circumstances, as well as her credit card debts, mortgage, 
and other expenses, as stated in paragraph 42 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. The court entered findings based on the Petitioner's own evidence presented as 
well as the educational background of the Respondent that she could earn at least 
$40,000.00 per year if she chose to do so. Such wages were imputed to the Respondent. 
See paragraph 42 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The Petitioner argues that it was a mistake on the part of the trial court to not 
"[f]actor in the $5,000.00 a month payment Bart Kotter was ordered to pay Elizabeth 
Vienna in accordance with paragraph 66 of the Order" in setting the award of alimony. 
(See Brief of Appellant, page 44, 1st paragraph). To the contrary, it would have been a 
clear abuse of discretion if the court had factored in that $5,000.00 per month payment. 
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This money is not income, bui a payment towards a property settlement. 1 o tactor this 
amount into alimony would have been tantamount to saying that the Respondent bears the 
responsibility to pay $5,000.00 per month of her own alimony obligation out of her 
property settlement proceeds, thus eliminating the property settlement. Chambers v. 
Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), states, in relevant part, "[t]he court's 
blanket reference to "substantial income from assets that have been awarded to her" is 
inadequate to justify the court's reduction of alimony." IdL at 843. The court is referring 
to the error made in that case by the trial judge inn ducing an award of alimony based on 
the speculative reasoning the recipient spouse could earn money by investing the 
substantial property settlement assets she was awarded in the divorce action. This is no 
more appropriate than would an order stating that the Respondent should sell her home 
awarded in the divorce and use the equity from that home to supplement any alimony 
shortfall from the Petitioner. Petitioner confuses property settlement proceeds with actual 
income from earnings. 
Petitioner next argues essentially for a rehearing on the issue of discovery 
sanctions for "Elizabeth Vienna's blatant disregard of court orders." Petitioner is trying 
to argue that no alimony should be awarded to Respondent because she failed to file 
enough financial information pursuant to court orders. Discovery sanctions are imposed 
in the sound discretion of the court. Respondent prejudiced herself as much as the 
Petitioner did by failing to provide voluminous information and, if no award would have 
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been made, Petitioner would not now be claiming error on the part of the court. 
"Sanctions for refusal to comply with an order of court or for failure to respond are set 
out in Rule 37, U.R.C.P., and are discretionary with the court." G. M. Leasing Corp. v. 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 at 1245 (Utah 1975). It is not an abuse of 
discretion for the count to make an award of alimony with less than all of the discovery 
having been provided as requested by the Petitioner, so long as the Jones factors can be 
satisfied. 
The court stated clearly in its July 27, 2006 Memorandum Decision what it felt the 
financial needs of the Respondent were, as well as how it arrived at those needs. In 
addition to the testimony of the Respondent, her financial condition was presented by 
Gary Jones in his testimony about financial distributions the Respondent had been 
receiving from the business during the pendency of this action. (See Memorandum 
Decision dated July 27, 2006 filed as Addendum 9). It is notable that these business 
distributions constitute the sole source of support during the pendency of this action that 
the Respondent was forced to live on, making them ostensibly extremely accurate about 
what the Respondent's present needs were at the time of trial. The Respondent was 
unable to talk about her needs during the term of the marriage due to her own failure to 
present any budget or financial declaration to the court at the time of trial. Gary Jones 
went into sufficient detail about the disbursements to allow the trial court to make an 
adequate assessment of the current needs of the Respondent, and that, coupled with the 
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Respondent's testimony and other evidence available to the couit, was what the court 
used in arriving at the alimony award as stated. 
POINT TTT- THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY ARRIVED AT THE 
VALUE OF TEAM BUILDERS INTERNATIONAL AT 
$1,600,000,00 AT THE DATE THE PETITIONER WAS 
FULLY AWARDED POSSESSION OF THE BUSINESS. 
Case law in the State of Utah in regard to disputed business valuations and expert 
testimony arising therefrom make it clear that this court has considerable discretion 
concerning not onlv the property division in a divorce proceeding, but the determination 
of the value of business assets and entities and that the trial court's actions enjoy a 
presumption of validity. See, Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2002), citing 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah App. 1994). 
While Petitioner wants to argue vehemently that the value of the business at the 
time of trial was not $1.6 million, the fact remains undisputed that Petitioner's own 
experts valued it at that same amount at the time it was valued. Marital assets are 
generally valued as of the date of the divorce decree. However, "Where one party has 
dissipated an asset, and hidden its value or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court 
may, in the exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital asset at some time other than 
the time the decree is entered." Parker v. Parker, 996 P.2d 565, 568 (Utah App. 2000), 
quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah App. 1999) In this case, there have 
been no allegations of the parties hiding assets or hiding the values of property, or 
otherwise acting obstructively with regard to any asset. Therefore, the court should value 
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the retirement accounts as of the date of the decree, according to the general, and not the 
exceptional, rule. 
Furthermore, the Petitioner was awarded the asset at the date of divorce 
(December 20, 2002) and at that time could have sold the asset for the $1.6 million dollar 
value. His choice to hold onto that asset should not prevent Respondent from realizing 
the entire value of her share of the asset, given that she did not have the luxury of 
deciding whether or not to sell the asset or hold onto it. If the Petitioner had been 
awarded stock valued at $1.6 million dollars at the time of divorce and chose not to sell it, 
and then 4 years later asked for the value to be taken at the time of trial because the 
market had gone bad over that same period of time, the court should not prejudice the 
Respondent's one-half interest. The Petitioner could have sold the stock, traded it, or 
held onto it, all of which were options that are the privilege of ownership. The 
Respondent had no such luxury. She has to simply wait to be paid out a sum certain 
amount over time. It goes without saying that had the business value increased 
dramatically, the Petitioner would not be arguing that the Respondent be awarded more 
than the value that was found at the time of divorce. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT WAS WELL WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION IN MAKING RULINGS BASED UPON THE 
EVIDENCE BEFORE IT AND NOT BEING CONCLUSIVELY 
BOUND BY THE ADMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 36(b) states as follows: 
Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively 
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established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or 
amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial order, the court 
may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation 
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that 
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense on the merits. Any admission made by a 
party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action 
only and is not an admission by him for any other purpose nor 
may it be used against him in any other proceeding 
Notably missing from this rule is any limitation on the court's ability to consider 
other evidence as well as the admissions. The only real impact of this rule is to admit into 
evidence questions that are presumptively admitted to by the party upon whom the 
Admissions have been propounded. Petitioner cites to State ex rel. E.R., 2 P.3d 948 (Utah 
2000) to discuss the effect of an admission has upon the court when admitted into 
evidence. "The requests for admissions [when Ilot properly responded to] as a matter of 
law are deemed admitted by simple operation of the rule." Id. at 949. This, Petitioner 
argues, "conclusively establishes] that [Respondent is not] entitled to alimony, [and] 
establishes] the value of the North Logan home with 5/4 acres at $600,000.00, and the 
value of Team Builders International is $800,000.00. (Brief of Appellant page 48, last 
paragraph). Clearly, Rule 39(b) does none of these things. Moreover, the only effect is 
on evidence for the court to consider. The court can assign whatever weight to that 
evidence that it chooses, but is not forced to accept the admitted information as 
established facts despite what other evidence may be before the trial court. 
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POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE 
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in relevant part: 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
The trial court states quite clearly in its Memorandum Decision of July 27, 2006, 
that it was the Petitioner who opened the door and put the value of the North Logan home 
squarely at issue. Irrespective of the reasons why, the Petitioner then allowed the 
Respondent to put into evidence, with no objection from Petitioner, "Defendant's 
[Elizabeth Vienna] Exhibits 1 and 2," which were appraisals showing markedly different 
values for the North Logan property. (See addendum 9, Brief of Appellant, page 3, last 
full paragraph). At this point the court is well within its discretion in setting the value of 
the property of the parties based on whatever evidence is before it. Additionally, the 
Respondent clearly contested the values which is a factual dispute militating against a 
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grant of summary judgement. The documents entered as Exhibits 1 and 2 represent 
documentary evidence supporting a genuine dispute of a material fact, meaning that 
summary judgement should not have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court should find that the trial judge acted within his 
discretion in making the awards of alimony as stated, made an accurate assessment of the 
parties property values, given the evidence presented to it, and that any factual errors the 
court may have made in regards to the Memorandum Decisions of Judge Low at best 
constitute harmless error. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of August, 2008 / 
C( J K U N Y V I ^ L I A M S , 
JARROD H. JENNINGS 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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